De Gaulle Wanted France to Be a World Power Once Again by
Riddle of de Gaulle; U.S. Analysts Differ About What He Wants and Why; Ride of de Gaulle: Analysts Differ on His Wants and Motives; SOVE EMPHASIZE; GOAL OF PRESTIGEOthers Say His IndependentStand Rises From Vision Looking Decades Ahead
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March 16, 1964
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WASHINGTON, March 15—President de Gaulle flew to America today, but not to the United States. Therein lies a story.
The French leader is starting a 10‐day tour of Mexico and French territories in the Western Hemisphere. Next fall he will visit most of the nations of South America. Yet in defiance of protocol and contrary to every other major ally, the general refuses to meet President Johnson within the United States. That defiance and seeming contrariness are the subject of the story.
General de Gaulle last flew the Atlantic in November to walk as a towering figure among the mourners of President Kennedy. The day Mr. Kennedy died, Charles de Gaulle became 73 years old. He also became the pivotal figure in the Western community, a symbol of the survival of haughty age over energetic youth. He came to pay tribute where. he has steadfastly refused fealty.
On that funeral day, a trend in world affairs became clear, and it has been underlined many times since: The France of General de Gaulle is determined to stand out and to walk apart and to adopt a posture and a diplomacy that have fascinated, perplexed, frustrated and even angered the Government of the United States. Why he does it is a; riddle. Washington hears and toys with dozens of explanations and as long as the confusion persists it cannot begin to know what to do about the problem. General de Gaulle's trips to Latin America, with a message to the region to "follow me" are only minor syptoms of the independence of Washington that he preaches and, increasingly, practices. He has made himself the central figure, many think the central obstacle, in the evolution of postwar Europe. He has begun, in his own way and time to deal with Communist . China and some now fret about his future deals with Moscow. His considerable shadow falls over Vietnam and the .rest of Southeast Asia. Not only West Europeans but Cypriotes, French Canadians, Peruvians and Cambodians.are urged tolook to him for inspiration and example. List of Differences Long The list of policy differences and divergencies between Paris and Washington—and most other Western capitals —has grown too long to be merely the index of a family tiff. On the future of Europe, the ties of Europe to the United States and, Britain, the form and fate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and even the role of the United Nations; the France of General de Gaulle stands apart. At a time when Britons are debating the surrender of nu-clear weapons, France is de- termined to acquire them. Her chair remains; vacant at the Geneva disarmament Conference. Her sigtiature is missing from the nuclear test-ban treaty. "When the chips are down," President Johnson remarked recently, France and the United States will stand together. Similarly, French officials like to recall that they stood with Washington in crises over Berlin and Cuba. But in matters that do not so immediately affect the life or death of either nation, the areas of agreement have become small. Analyses at Extremes What is General de Gaulle up to and what is he about? In Washington, as elsewhere, analyses of the general tend to run toward extremes. First, there are those, pro and con, who see in him a genius who long ago plotted every move and envisioned even his tactical failures. They credit him with a vision of the world as it will be decades hence or condemn him for a plot concocted long ago in the vocabularv of another century. A second and larger group of analysts sees the general as a tactician, progressive or reactionary, who has no policy except the pursuit of prestige and profit for France. They see him as a skillful opportunist taking advantage of confusion in the world or as the willful creator of confusion. They believe that he was driven to independent conduct by the wrongs done to France in the past or that he is using independence to avenge personal and national humiliations. There are explanations, primarily in terms of personality, that take off from Sir Winston Churchill's message to President Truman in 1845: "I am sure that in the long run no understanding will be reached with General de Gaulle." There are explanations, primarily in terms of diplomacy, that rest upon the record of France's humiliating defeat in World War II, Washington's tolerance of her defeat in Indochina in 1954, American opposition to the French and British Suez campaign in 1956, the British‐American refusal to admit France to a NATO triumvirate in 1958, and Britain's choice of nuclear collaboration with the United States, instead of Europe, in 1962. Kennedy Was Puzzled There are sympathetic interpretations that find General de Gaulle's grievance against Anglo‐Saxons legitimate, his realism toward Moscow and Peking admirable and his hard‐headed bargaining. for France in the West understandable. There are hostile interpretations that portray the general as the bearer of the "romantic illusions of a Napoleon." President Kennedy remarked shortly before his death that he did not really understand French policy or strategy very well. He said he felt certain that General de Gaulle did not want intimate relations with the United States on any terms. He was further quoted as having said that the general seemed to desire a certain tension with the United States, to help train Europeans to think for themselves and to stop counting lazily on the money or political leadership that had come from across the Atlantic Mr. Kennedy's comment seemed to be based on the most dispassionate analysis of French policy available in his Administration. This analysis, like all others, is speculative, but it has tried to include some parts of the more clearly hostile or sympathetic interpretations, It is a synthesis accepted by a number of officials here, but not in every detail.
In general, theory goes something like this:
An explanation must begin with a reference to the Europe of the nineteen‐thirties, when General c e Gaulle's political ideas mmatured It was then that he watched French statesmen virtually resign international leadership to Britain and follow Lordon first to appeasement at Munich and then to war over Poland.
Those policies led directly to the humiliation of France in World War II and to the wartime British‐American domination of the West. To General de Gaulle and others it proved that a country that entrusts its defense or diplomacy to others hnasno reliable defense or diplomacy. In the general's shorthand, it meant that "France cannot be France without greatness."
General de Gaulle spent the war period trying to preserve France's identity and prerogatives. Personal and national rebuffs London and Washington became virtually indistingulishable. "National renovation" became his mission.
His prescription for postwar French policy was simply to assure France's primacy in West Europe. He proposed to prevent a new German Reich and to contract necessary alliances in the East or the West without ever accepting any kind of dependency.
Continental Europeans, in other words, were to become independent of both the Russians antd the Anglo‐Saxons and wary of the Germans, making France the natural leader of the new Europe In time that Europe would be one of three major world powers, possibly even the arbiter between East and West.
The coldwar disrupted this forecast, but not, apparently, General de Gaulle's conception of France's purpose.
The East‐West conflict drew the United States and the Soviet Union into the heart of Europe and made the Continent's disengagement increasingly difficult. Nuclear weapons further reduced the power and significance of the European nations.
When General de Gaulle was recalled to power in 1958, France had recovered some strength, but her opportunities could be foreseen only by an ardent patriot. To realize his ambition for French independence and status, the general had first to dispose of the ruinous problem of Algeria, to bring political order out of parliamentary chaos and to restore the nation's financial health.
He succeeded to an extraordinary degree and thus earned credibility at home and among some abroad for his longerrange purposes. These were:
qTo replace the French empire with a French influence in Europe and then around the world.
qTo make France the nuclear and therefore military superior of most nations (though clearly not of the Soviet Union and the United States)
qTo assure French primacy on a resurgent Continent.
qIn time, to preside over the final European settlement when the United States and the Soviet Union retreated or were elbowed from Eurone.
That seemed to be the meaning of his oft‐quoted remark that France "could facilitate the emergence of a Eurone balanced between the Atlantic and the Urals."
Because France today has a population of fewer than 50 million and a land area smaller than that of Texas, because her nuclear force will be modest if it will ever be, and because by income and population France is only 30 per cent of the six nations of the European Economic Community the general's ambition could in his view be realized only in a Europe where national sovereignties were not diluted and only if the United States was eased out of Europe rather than somehow joined to it.
The Washington theory that rests on this view of General de Gaulle's sense of history and destiny holds that within these conditions the general moves like any government, responding to crises and opportunities, successes and failures
For instance, he has clearly been of two minds about the Common Market. He opposed it at first and saw it as a threat to French sovereignty. But in timme he also saw it as an opportunity to. promote France's economy, to foster a popular sense of Europe and to emphasize a distinction between Europe and the United States and Britain.
That ambivalence seems to exist even today. It explains why many observers believe the general may wreck the Community rather than submit to majority rule within it, as he rmiust by Jan1,1966 But it also eixplains why others feel he will decide that he must stay in the Commtmunity to sustain French prosperity and to support his worldwide game
It Is easy, therefore, to conclude that the Gaullist purpose is to pursue status for France and to make her a first‐rate power that will be consulted on major world questions and whose primacy in Europe is beyond question. But the means by which the general pursues that ambition are not inevitable and not even always predietable.
Sometimes; analysts suspect, General de Gaulle acts primarily to whet his own people's appetite for status and spirit despite his grand historical explanations of every move.
It is against this backdrop of Gaullist ambition—and fear—that the more dispassionate analysts here assess recent French nolicies
To them, the general's pres‐ ent view of the Western alliance is that Europe and, foremost, France must now begin to move out of the "shelter of American power." Though the Continent is far from a political reality, it should begin to think as one. Though it must depend upon the United States for defense against the Soviet Union, it can in any case count upon help only to the extent that such help is dictated by Washington's sense of self‐interest.
Accordingly, he makes only token contributions to NATO. He believes the American‐oriented organization of the alliance is outmoded. Since Washington refused to share with France direction of an alliance that would deal with worldwide political questions, he opposes such a role for it and feels no political obligation to it.
He believes France is the first country in the alliance to have become aware of the possibility of having an independent though not necessarily antiAmerican policy. He seeks European converts to that view and hopes that in time they will join him in the alteration of NATO, perhaps beyond recognition.
Meanwhile, the general proposes to continue to develop an independent French nuclear air force and frowns upon Washington's plan for an allied nuclear navy.
Last year, after vetoing British membership in the Common Market, General de Gaulle and the retiring Chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. It pledged each to a special relationship that, in the general's mind at least, seemed to be the first step toward an independent Europe.
In practice, the treaty has not significantly altered FrenchGerman relations. They are close on European economic questions but far apart on overall Western and Atlantic policies. Still, the treaty exists, perhaps for future resuscitation, while General de Gaulle continues an intricate game in Europe.
He is engaged in a contest with the five other Common Market members over the political and military future of their Community. He seeks protection for French agriculture and opportunity for French industry.
He seems eager to promote the unity of the Six for a future independent course. But he remains wary of the consequences for French sovereignty of ever greater integration and he still fears that the grouping will fall under American influence or domination.
With these complicated attitudes, he must shape France's tactics in the coming trade negotiations, which will determine how restrictive the Community will be toward the rest of the world, particularly the United States.
The Gaullist European policy has still another side, facing east toward the Soviet Union
It seems to rest on the thesis that, whenever the grand postwar settlement is reached, it must be Europe and most of all France, rather than the United States, that will speak for Europe. He seems to hope that Eastern Europe, as distinct from the Soviet Union, will in time also acquire an independent seat at the conference table.
Therefore the general has appeared eager to prevent not only an East‐West conflict but also, until his independent Europe is ready, an East‐West settlement. Longer than most Western leaders, he resisted the idea that the Soviet Union was changing and becoming ready for at least some negotiation. He balked at most American initiatives for such negotiation.
The general has used denunciations of Communist ideology to justify his rigidity in EastWest affairs. But he also appears to believe that ideology is disappearing and that nationstates, East and West, will in time behave in more classical patterns. It is in these terms that he would explain both the Chinese Communist and French rebellions against Soviet and American tutelage.
But this recentt Gaullist policy in Europe has encountered what some here call failures or at least setbacks and delays.
Western Europe has not really responded to the personality of General de Gaulle or the notion of a Europe led by him or France. The general's argument for independence is applauded in many quarters, but his specific military, economic and political policies have not had the same attraction.
Europe needs France for its own economic and political designs, but French nationalism is not necessarily more popular than American domination. Most of the West European nations are not as free as is France from American entreaty or pressure.
Thus the general's power to say no in Europe or in the larger Western alliance has been greater than his ability to rally support for affirmative action. The ineffectiveness of his treaty with West Germany is a major example.
Also, much sooner than the general expected, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken some tentative steps toward accommodation, spurred by the equally unexpected rift between Moscow and Peking.
Some of the most rgent French policies, therefore, and some that are only suspected for the future, are viewed here as the general's response to these delays or failures.
That response seems to be threefold: to wait out Europe until it is more receptive, to extend the campaign for French independence and status to the entire world and to experiment with a slightly different approach to Communist nations.
Some steps, like the recognition of Communist China, might serve all three purposes. Contacts with Peking and the search for influence in Asia help to establish France as the only continental European nation with interests, if not influence, throughout the world.
Similar reasoning makes plausible the persistent report from Paris that the general plans a journey to Moscow before long. There do not appear to be major opportunities to expand Soviet‐French trade, but the general may hope to use some economic inducements to promote political aims.
In the long run, some officials believe, a Gaullist in France and a Communist in Moscow may find a joint interest in negotiating the United States out of Europe. Some policy planners have begun to wonder whether France and Germany together might not some day seek their own deal with Moscow.
President de Gaulle's message to the world at large, spoken or implied, seems to be that France is an example of a nation that stands on her own feet, that the nuclear stalemate between the big powers and the erosion of ideology create opportunities for lesser nations and that influence is available to all that seek it.
The moral is meant for the smaller countries, East as well as West, but for the time being it tends to cut more against United States influence in the undeveloped regions. The general does not appear to be interested in creating a new bloc, only to give independence and nationalism the respectable approval of a venerable European power with vestigial influence in many parts of the world.
He does not bring much power to Latin America, Asia or even Africa to support that message. But he seems to believe that a certain kind of power lies in prestige and that prestige can be gained even by words if they are nlanted in fertile soil.
Probably the best example of the power of words was the general's comment last summer that "neutrality" for former French Indochina, including Vietnam, was the West's only hope in Asia.
As Washington continues to insist, he has never specified how he would negotiate such neutrality nor has he any real power to apply to negotiations to achieve it. But as the American position in Vietnam deteriorated, the attractiveness of "neutrality" to some in Vietnam and in the United States became greater, as did the volume of the debate and the status of France.
In the same spirit, France has regained the goodwill of a Cambodia that is turning against the United States.
To her new relations with China, France has brought the goodwill and the United Nations votes of 18 former French African nations. The loyalty of those nations is retained by Paris with the greater portion of the $1 billion that General de Gaulle spends on foreign aid each year and with the timely application of military aid, as in Gabon recently.
In Latin America, a few industrial sales to Cuba and a shrewdly timed New Year's toast to the Cuban Ambassador in Paris have been reciprocated by a Cuban expression of "much sympathy" for the general.
Although France cannot afford lavish aid programs for Latin America, the general holds the key to the Common Market's willingness to admit Latin commodities to the Continent and his siren song of independence without Communism is expected to fall on receptive ears in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia and the other nations on his two itineraries.
In the Middle East, General de Gaulle has made himself the steadfast supporter and arms supplier of Israel, but he has now also extended a hand to several Arab nations
In the United Nations, he acts out the role of a big power, the only continental nation with a permanent Security Council seat. But he also stands with the Communists and others against supranational arrangements that encroach upon sovereignty.
In gauging the French challenge, Americans often wonder whether General de Gaulle is content to play by the customary rules of diplomatic and economic competition or whether he is plotting to subvert United States interests and policies. In another form, this question asks whether he is content, to promote France or whether he is also intent upon slandering and injuring the United States.
Rumors of plots arise from the presence of influential French teachers, technicians, advisers and businessmen in places like Vietnam and Cambodia. They arise also from the vigorous French cultural activity encountered, by American Peace Corps volunteers in some African nations.
Premier Nguyen Khanh of South Vietnam seized power Jan. 30 to oppose an alleged French plot for "neutrality" and he has since accused the French of wishing to assassinate him.
If United States agents around the world have uncov-ered evidence of French plot-ting, they have failed to display that evidence here. A number of analysts who should have such information do not believe that France is deliberately sabotaging American economic and military aid programs.
Slander is another matter. Some officials have suspected the French Government of encouraging rumors that the United States was plotting on the side of rebellious French generals in Algeria. Last week the Administration raised speculation whether Paris was not behind whispered reports that the United States had engineered a brief insurrection in Gabon and was applying undue pressure to make Belgium buy American rather than French tanks.
French policies do, of course, have a tendency to undermine American policies. But there is considerable if sometimes academic debate about whether anti‐Americanism is a stronger force in French diplomacy than the promotion of purely French objectives.
Thus far, the United States' response to the Gaullist challenge has been restrained
Washington's firmest reply was to the general's veto of British membership in the Common Market. The Adrinistration has worked hard since then to hold the allegiance of West Germany and the other market members, to isolate General de Gaulle in the negotiations for economic and political integration of Europe and to promote the allied nuclear navy idea as the alternative to the French path toward independent nuclear deterrents.
The United States also has refused to allow French vetoes to obstruct further efforts to seek agreements with the Soviet Union.
But the battle for European unity and Atlantic partnership, as defined by President Kennedy July 4, 1962, is far from over. Washington believes its grand design will prevail in the end. Many anti‐Gaullist Europeans are no longer so certain.
American officials often complain that General de Gaulle is pursuing independence while in fact he hides behind the United States power. Some say he is only enjoying the luxury of France's relative lack of responsibility around the world.
But despite the recent debates here about the need for more meetings between French and American leaders, Washington feels frustrated. It is torn by conflicting analyses of General de Gaulle's purposes, but few men, in any case, know what else might be done.
A major question is whether Gaullism will survive the 73year‐old general.
Analysts here say that neither the French economy nor the French political, system is necessarily stable for all time or a proper base for a Gaullist approach to the world. Some believe that even the French nuclear force will in time become an economic burden without military value.
The Administration hopes that France, after President de Gaulle, will return to the fold. But it is aware that the future is too murky for anyone to know.
For the moment, there are more signs each day, despite the official denials, that the divergent interests of France and the United States are becoming greater than the bonds between them, that the assumptions of Amerian post war policy are being undermined as well as challenged by General de Gaulle and that, with or without the general, his kind of "independance" in France or elsewhere may plague Washington more and more in the years to come.
Source: https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/16/archives/riddle-of-de-gaulle-us-analysts-differ-about-what-he-wants-and-why.html
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